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ANTITRUST AS CONSUMER CHOICE:
COMMENTS ON THE NEW PARADIGM
Spencer Weber Wailer*
I have been searching for some time for the perfect movie about antitrust.
So far my top two are Grosse Pointe Blank' with John Cusack and Dan
Ackroyd and Demolition Man2 with Sylvester Stallone and Sandra Bullock.
Both movies deal with consumer choice in different ways as the lodestone for
antitrust and show why Professor Robert Lande, with his colleague Neil
Averitt of the Federal Trade Commission, has articulated a lasting vision for
antitrust enforcement in their articles about consumer choice and his remarks
at the American Antitrust Institute symposium
In Grosse Pointe Blank, John Cusack is a young hit man for the mob who
is returning home for his tenth high school reunion. He is being stalked by
Dan Ackroyd, an older rival hit man who is infuriated by Cusack's willingness
to take jobs for a lesser fee. In the middle of a shoot out from opposite sides
of a car, Ackroyd proposes forming what he dubs a "union" that would set
fees for hits so they would keep from undercutting each other. The anti-
competitive potential of such an arrangement is obvious and would be per se
unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
4
Professor Lande's point about consumer choice is perhaps better borne
out by my favorite antitrust film, Demolition Man. In that movie Sylvester
Stallone is a violent cop who has been frozen cryogenically and eventually
thawed out to capture an even more violent super criminal who has escaped
from the deep freeze into a docile world long since evolved beyond violence.
Sandra Bullock is assigned to escort Stallone and acclimate him to his new
* Professor and Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University
Chicago School. Of Counsel, Kaye Scholer, New York City. Professor, Brooklyn Law School 1990-2000.
1. GROSSE PoINTE BLANK (Hollywood Pictures 1997).
2. DEMOLMON MAN (Warner Bros. 1993).
3. Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Van's Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (200 1); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason
for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LoY. CONSUMER L. REP. 44 (1998) [hereinafter
Averitt & Lande, Consumer Choice]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A
Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST LJ. 713 (1997) [hereinafter
Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty].
4. See United States v. Socony-vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Such an arrangement would
also be unlawful under any number of provisions of the federal criminal code and the laws of all fifty states.
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surroundings. Stallone passes by a public space and sees a sign for a Taco
Bell and says: "I can't believe you still have Taco Bells!" Bullock looks
puzzled and replies: "I don't understand what you mean. Taco Bell was the
only restaurant to survive the Franchise Wars. Now all restaurants are Taco
Bells."5
Unless you want to live in a world in which all restaurants are Taco Bells,
Robert Lande has elegantly summed up the case for using consumer choice as
the fundamental rule of antitrust. In this essay, I will both praise and extend
Lande' s consumer choice paradigm and give some concrete examples of how
consumer choice can help anchor antitrust decision-making by both the
agencies and the courts.
I. CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE FUTURE OF ANTITRUST
Consumer choice is a particularly valuable way to synthesize the
underlying purposes of antitrust and consumer protection law because it
highlights the inadequacy of the current tools of the trade. I share Professor
Lande's fundamental point that price theory alone is an inadequate tool to
make all antitrust decisions.6 I also share Professor Gundlach' s fundamental
point that price theory, and indeed all of antitrust economics, can be usefully
supplemented through looking at business theory, particularly marketing and
strategic planning, in deciding whether to bring cases and how they should be
determined.'
What consumer choice gives us is a relatively simple (in a good way) lens
to distinguish between which competitive restraints should be the subject of
antitrust concern and which should be either ignored as benign or applauded
as helpful to consumers. It is particularly heartening that the agencies and the
courts have acted recently in a way that is consistent with the consumer choice
paradigm even if they have not necessarily adopted this terminology.'
5. http://www.sciflicks.com/demolition-man/quotes.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2001).
6. Averitt & Lande, Consumer Choice, supra note 3, at 55; Averitt & Lande, Consumer
Sovereignty, supra note 3, at 755-56.
7. See Gregory T. Gundlach, Choice as the Focus of Antitrust: A Marketing Perspective, 62 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 527, 528-29 (2001). See also Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and the
Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. -. (2001).
8. Perhaps the closest is Commissioner Thomas Leary who has discussed "consumer sovereignty"
and "buyer freedom" (along with "seller freedom") as the organizing principal and tension in modern
antitrust. Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value ofAntitrust in the New Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST
L.J. 545 (2000).
[Vol. 62:535
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The cutting edge of antitrust enforcement, at least for the immediate
future, appears to be cases involving non-price restraints.9 These are the
innovative hard cases where price theory has little to add to their analysis or
resolution, and post-Chicago economics is still struggling to get beyond ad hoc
analyses of individual cases. Consumer choice can be the starting place to
shed light on where the government should spend its investigative resources,
and what, if anything, the agencies and the courts should do.
A. Tying Together Intel, Microsoft, AOl/Time Warner, Travelocity,
Visa/Mastercard
Consumer choice provides a broad theme tying together the recent high
profile cases brought by both the Antitrust Division and the FTC. These cases
reveal a pattern of common concerns without regard to who should win any
of these individual cases. What seems to be at stake is an overriding concern
that firms in industries characterized by network effects, strong intellectual
property protection, and a tendency toward winner-take-all outcomes not
position themselves as the gatekeepers at the key checkpoints of the new
economy. In all of these cases, the fear is that the dominant firms are
preventing existing competitors and new entrants from access to consumers.
Similarly, consumers are denied the ability to select the type of products and
innovative technology that might prevail in the market but for the dominant
firm(s) keeping a choke hold on an essential facility or at least a key gateway
to consumers.
One of the first such modern cases was MCI Communications
Corporation v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company,"0 where MCI
prevailed in proving that AT&T had unlawfully prevented interconnection for
newly deregulated long distance providers with its then monopoly over the
network for local telephone service that was necessary to complete both ends
of any long distance call." This decision was the beginning of a process,
along with the breakup settling the government monopolization suit against
AT&T, 2 which has brought us to the brink of an era of extensive competition
9. These are the innovative cases that both the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission have chosen to pursue in recent years beyond the type of hard-core criminal price-fixing cases
and limited merger enforcement that enjoy a broad consensus over the years.
10. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
11. Seeid.atl131-45.
12. See Justice Department's Competitive Impact Statement on Settlement with American
Telephone and Telegraph Co., reprinted in 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 401 (1982); Justice
Settles AT&T Case; Bell System Agrees to Divest Local Operating Companies, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE
20011
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in both local and long distance communications 3 and the revolutionary
prospect of Internet telephony at little or no charge.
The Microsoft case has been cast by both the parties and the court as
involving whether Microsoft used its dominance in operating systems to
foreclose the growth of other competing technologies and software
platforms.'4 The most important question now before us is whether the court's
remedy of separating Microsoft's operating systems division from its software
division through divestiture achieves meaningful consumer choice in the
Goldilock's sense: not too much as Microsoft fears, and not too little as
certain critics of the timidity of the plan suggest, but just right (at least as
much as one can expect in the real world).
While the FTC ultimately settled its case with Intel," and the private
plaintiff did not prevail in its case against the same conduct, 6 similar concerns
animated those cases as well. Was Intel using a position of dominance to
coerce customers into surrendering innovative technology that could
potentially be used to undermine Intel's dominance in the chip market?
Similarly, will the Time Warner/AOL merger create a similar gatekeeper
for media content? 7 Will the cable, Internet, and telephony mergers create the
same gatekeeper for delivery of such content?" Do the Visa/Mastercard
affiliation° rules lock in dominance for those networks against their
competitors and promote an inappropriate coziness for relations between
members of the network? 9 Will the new airline joint venture for online
ticketing create either of these concerns?2° While the questions are relatively
easy to articulate, the answers are not. However, all of these cases share a
concern of preventing the creation of choice destroying monoliths, & la
REG. REP. (BNA) 82 (1982).
13. See Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 397 (1996).
14. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (order as to relief); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact).
. 15. Intel Corp., 64 Fed. Reg. 20,134 (Apr. 23, 1999) (analysis to aid public comment and
commissioners' statements); Intel Corp., 64 Fed. Reg. 14,246 (Mar. 24, 1999) (proposed consent decree).
16. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
17. FTC, FCC are Urged to Scrutinize AOL/Time Warner Dealfor Access Abuses, 78 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 465 (2000).
18. Critics Question Telecom Merger Wave, Can't Formulate Proposal to Reject Consolidation,
78 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 530 (2000).
19. DOJ Would Ban Simultaneous Service on Governing Boards of Visa, Mastercard, 79
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 164 (2000).
20. IG Urges Regulators to Implement Measures to Ensure Web Site as Competition Friendly, 79
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 81 (2000).
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Microsoft, in the myriad of new forms of network industries that are arising
in the most vibrant sectors of our economy. Consumer choice tells you where
to look and tells you what questions to ask.
B. Prescription Drugs v. Generics
Another series of cases currently being pursued by the FTC are an
additional illustration of how consumer choice can take us further than any of
the conventional theories. In March 2000, the FTC charged two drug makers
with violating Section 5 of the FTC Act by reaching agreements with generic
drug makers to delay bringing competing generic drugs into the market." On
that same day the FTC also announced that it negotiated consent decrees with
two other drug companies charged with similar violations. The nature of the
violation was simple: by keeping a competing generic version of a branded
prescription drug off the market consumers (and prescribing physicians) had
been deprived of a clear choice between branded and generic medicine, which
had the potential to save hundreds of millions of dollars per year. 3 A district
court in Michigan subsequently agreed with this analysis and held one of these
agreements to constitute per se unlawful market allocation in a private
consumer class action. 4
In these investigations, the FTC appears to be wielding consumer choice
as a scalpel not an ax. The FTC recently chose not to charge Eli Lilly for its
agreement with a drug manufacturer that manufactured a competing version
of a Lilly drug about to go off patent. While the public record is silent as to
the precise basis for the FTC's decision not to proceed, one fact stands out.
Lilly acquired rights not to a generic clone of its drug, but to a new substance
that performed the same functions as the branded drug but without certain key
side effects. Presumably the FTC did not view this agreement as the type of
collusion it had previously challenged, but instead chose not to proceed
following the standard antitrust joint venture or acquisition analysis it
routinely undertakes in this and other high-tech industries. Under the rubric
of consumer choice, this case can be distinguished since consumers stand to
benefit through increased opportunities to treat their conditions without
debilitating side effects.
21. Press Release, FTC ChargesDrug Manufacturers with Stiing Competition in Two Prescription
Drug Markets, available at http:llwww.ftc.gov/opal2OOO/03/hoechst.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (Order No. 13).
2001]
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II. SOME OLD FRIENDS
Consumer choice does not only work at the frontier of antitrust issues.
It is also a powerful analytical tool for some of the lasting conundrums of
antitrust enforcement.
A. Resale Price Maintenance
One of the continuing controversies is the continuing per se treatment of
minimum resale price maintenance agreements. Only a rather blatant form of
such an agreement would even be subject to per se condemnation at the
present time. Maximum resale price maintenance is now subject to the full
rule of reason after the Supreme Court's decision in Khan.25 Most minimum
resale price maintenance will be considered under some version of the rule of
reason because of restrictive definitions of both "agreement" under
Monsanto26 and "price" under Sharp Electronics."
Plaintiffs who have been terminated as price cutters who fail to meet
either or both of these legal hurdles find themselves subject to summary
dismissal, and occasionally sanctions, despite having alleged and proved that
they were terminated specifically for their discounting and that prices then
went up substantially after their termination.28 Where they usually fail is the
ability to show that there was an underlying agreement between the
manufacturer and the remaining distributors as to price or price level. 9
Despite this rather accommodating standard for checking what is technically
per se unlawful, the remaining enthusiasts from the Chicago school continue
to press the case that even explicit resale price maintenance agreements hold
sufficiently pro-competitive potential that it should be treated under the full
rule of reason (if not ignored completely).3"
25. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
26. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
27. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
28. See, e.g., Center Video Indus. Co. v. United Media, Inc., 995 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1993).
29. See, e.g., Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1998).
30. See Lino A. Graglia, Is Antitrust Obsolete?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 11 (1999); Andy M.
Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control, 50 HASTINGs LJ. 573 (1999); Roger
D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht RuleAfter Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NoTREDAME L. REv.
123 (1998); Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, Albrecht Overruled-At Last, 66 ANTrrRUST L.J. 537
(1998).
[Vol. 62:535
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Both the evolution of the economy, and the teachings of business theory
as Professor Gundlach has elaborated, suggest why we should be more
suspicious, rather than less, of such arrangements.3' In today's economy the
brand reigns supreme. Indeed whole sectors of the economy, like the dot
corns, have little current value except for their brand equity.32
In more old fashion antitrust terms, product differentiation (even
monopolistic competition) dominates business strategy and defines the
modem marketplace. In this world, consumer choice may be defined almost
entirely by the very type of intra-brand competition that RPM seeks to
eliminate. Robert Pitofsky, the current chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission perhaps stated it best in his 1983 article In Defense of
Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price
Fixing.33 Pitofsky effectively rebutted in eight pages the hundreds of pages
devoted to the arguments on the other side and succinctly stated:
"[A]uthorizing the manufacturer to decide what mix of products and services
is desirable, instead of allowing the market to decide that question, is
inconsistent with the nation's commitment to a competitive process."34
B. Price Discrimination
Price discrimination remains the bte noire of antitrust, particularly
secondary line injury cases under the Robinson-Patman Act. These issues are
almost entirely the creature of counseling and private antitrust litigation, since
neither enforcement agency devotes any significant resources to this area. In
such Robinson-Patman cases, a distributor receives less favorable prices than
one of her competitors and brings a private treble damage action. The courts
31. See Gundlach, supra note 7, at 530-33. See also LESLIE DE CHERNATONY & MALCOLM
McDONAL, CREATING POWERFUL BRANDS IN CONSUMER SERVICE AND INDUSTRIAL MARKETS 10,20 (2d
ed. 1998) (successful brand has ability to sustain added value in the face of competition); ROBERT M.
GRANT, CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY ANALYSIS 208 (2d ed. 1995) (superiority of differentiation over cost
advantage as strategy to create sustainable competitive advantage); KEVIN LANE KELLER, STRATEGIC
BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING, AND MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 4, 9 (1998) (product
differentiation is the goal of brand management with non-price advantages of successful branding including
brand loyalty, barriers to entry, and the creation of transferable legal property).
32. See Kurt Badenhausen, Brandwagon, FORBES, June 12, 2000, at 60B (reporting results of over
1,000,000 surveys of which brands are on upswing or downswing and stating "In the post-industrial age
intangibles are everything"); Al Ries & Laura Ries, The Hazards of Corporate Vanity, UPSIDE, June i,
2000, at 252 (discussing eleven so-called immutable laws of internet branding).
33. Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against
Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. LJ. 1487 (1983).
34. Id. at 1493.
20011
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hold that a substantial price differential over time creates virtually an
irrebutable presumption that competition has been injured permitting
recovery.35
This presumption and the entire Robinson-Patman Act has been the
subject of withering criticism for decades. The Act and its interpretation have
been attacked as operating counter to the spirit of the antitrust laws, counter
to common sense, and as inconsistent with legislative history.3 6 Most critics
prefer its repeal or its interpretation to track more closely the other provisions
of the Clayton Act and Sherman Act.37
The law and economics crowd further critiques the Act as prohibiting a
practice that increases efficiency and has the potential of increasing output
and reducing dead weight loss to society as a whole.3" They also attack the
Act as a form of special pleading for inefficient mom and pop grocery stores
that injures consumers by limiting competition from more efficient larger
competitors.39
Part of the skepticism toward the need for price discrimination rules has
stemmed from the historical belief that price discrimination affecting
competition is relatively rare. It requires both significant market power and
the means to implement the differential pricing scheme and preventing
arbitrage from low price buyers to high price ones. Even if successful, it often
would only have a negligible, or even positive, impact on output and
consumers. Customers would be free to opt for the benefits of high costs
personalized shopping at the corner store or the less personal low price option
at the Kmart or Wal-Mart type operation.
Changes in the economy and the insights of consumer choice again
suggest that the situation is not quite as cut and dried as most people think.
First, a combination of intellectual property law and the rapid growth of the
Internet have made perfect price discrimination a real possibility. Indeed,
Wendy Gordon, a prominent intellectual property professor has described the
essence of intellectual property as the ability to achieve true price
discrimination.' The transfer of information by electronic download from the
35. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
36. For a recent example see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition:
Unfinished Business, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 125 (2000).
37. See, e.g., Andrew L Cavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt:
To Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L. 1057 (1999).
38. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX 280-98 (1978).
39. See id. at 284-85, 296-98. The bill was originally entitled the Wholesale Grocers Protection Act.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW § 13.6 n.2 (1985).
40. Wendy J. Gordon, Viewing Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for
[Vol. 62:535
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Internet is the new frontier for the application of price discrimination-not the
kindly country doctor who charges the town millionaire more for his annual
check-up than the poor widow and her children. Even in the world of tangible
goods, the growth of auction and reverse auction models on the Internet has
brought us back to the era around the turn of the century, before Wannamakers
in Philadelphia broke from tradition and introduced price tags, when salesmen
carefully assessed the likely resources and knowledge of the prospective buyer
and quoted prices accordingly. Today, the combination of Internet auction
and reverse auction technology and the voluminous personal information
available on-line creates the reality of each book, song, software, or
autographed photo of your favorite sports hero being sold to you at precisely
the price that reflects the intensity of your use or desire for the item with the
technological means to prevent its transfer to other buyers. Whether this
promotes or harms meaningful choice is a complex question that is beyond the
scope of this essay, other than to note that careful attention to consumer
choice also requires the careful reexamination of both old doctrines as well as
the cutting edge theories of antitrust.
C. Monopolization
Consumer choice finally can help illuminate one of the oldest, and yet
most troubling, aspects of antitrust-the difference between an enlightened
technological visionary and an evil rapacious monopolist. The agencies and
courts have struggled with this from the time of Northern Securities4' and
Standard Oil4 to the Microsof 3 case of today. The current legal formulations
are vague and virtually useless." Alcoa talked about unlawfully maintaining
a monopoly through means other than superior skill, foresight, industry, or
having such monopoly thrust upon it.4" Grinnell talked about unlawfully
acquiring or maintaining a monopoly other than as a result of superior
Shrinkwrap Contracts and the Internet, Public Lecture at Brooklyn Law School (Apr. 18, 2000).
41. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
42. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
43. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (order as to relief); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact).
44. See William L. Reynolds & Spencer Weber Waller, Legal Process and the Past of Antitrust, 48
SMU L. REV. 1811, 1824-27 (1995).
45. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,430 (2d Cir. 1945).
2001]
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product, business acumen, or historic accident.' Aspen modified this standard
to focus on the presence or absence of a legitimate business justification.47
Controversial cases like Aspen48 and Kodak49 now make sense when
viewed through the lens of consumer choice. Each case dealt with
opportunistic behavior by firms who dramatically changed their behavior to
take advantage of consumers who were locked into dealing with a particular
supplier, even if that supplier did not have market power in the traditional
price theory sense of the term. In Kodak, the plaintiffs demonstrated that they
were entitled to a trial by showing material issues of fact as to how choice was
restricted and competition harmed for those consumers already locked into a
Kodak copier system who wished to purchase parts and/or service through an
independent service organization." In Aspen, the dominant ski mountain
owner abruptly stopped marketing a joint lift ticket with its remaining
competitor in the area despite years of prior and profitable practice." The
plaintiffs prevailed at trial and ultimately on appeal in the Supreme Court by
showing, in a masterful and common sense way, how consumers skiing in the
Aspen region were harmed and choice restricted by this behavior.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Consumer choice is an extremely powerful and important tool for
rationalizing antitrust policy. That does not mean it is an uncontroversial one.
The debates over the meaning and purpose of the antitrust laws have shown
that the fundamental fight is one of value choices not original intent.
Although values are deeply personal, stubbornly held, and not easily
changeable by rational argument, consumer choice already has struck a chord
with many people within the antitrust community. Consumer choice is one of
the most appealing value choices to come along to guide us toward the kind
of legal rules to regulate in the most light-handed way possible the economy
as it evolves in directions we can only guess.
46. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
47. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604-05, 608 (1985).
48. Id.
49. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
50. Id. at 473-77.
51. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 606-08.
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